University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Connecticut Law Review

School of Law

2011

Common Law Same-Sex Marriage Essay
Peter Nicolas

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review

Recommended Citation
Nicolas, Peter, "Common Law Same-Sex Marriage Essay" (2011). Connecticut Law Review. 102.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/102

CONNECTICUT

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 43

FEBRUARY 2011

NUMBER 3

Essay
Common Law Same-Sex Marriage
PETER NICOLAS
In this Essay, I demonstrate that, with the extension of the right to marry to
same-sex couples in Iowa, the District of Columbia, and New Hampshire (all
states that recognize common law marriage), there now exists the possibility
that—for the first time in the United States—a same-sex couple may enter into a
legally recognized common law marriage. In the Essay, I first show, as a
doctrinal matter, that same-sex couples have the right to enter into common law
marriages in these three jurisdictions, and I explain and compare the criteria for
entering into common law marriages in each of them. I then address the question
whether it makes sense—as a policy matter—to expand the concept of common
law marriage to include same-sex couples, including an analysis of whether being
a closeted same-sex couple is consistent with being in a common law marriage. I
conclude that the lack of consistent access to religious and public officials willing
to perform same-sex marriages coupled with the libertarian spirit underlying both
same-sex marriage and common law marriage militate in favor of recognizing
common law same-sex marriages. I also demonstrate the advantages that
common law marriage—with its lack of a paper trail—provides to same-sex
couples who need to keep their relationships closeted, such as those in the military
or foreign nationals with temporary visas. Finally, on the assumption that the
U.S. Supreme Court may eventually hold that same-sex couples have a
constitutional right to marry, I examine the criteria for entering into common law
marriages in the remaining nine states that recognize common law marriage.
With respect to these remaining states—nearly all of which have bans on same-sex
marriage enshrined into their state constitutions and that thus will allow same-sex
marriage only if ordered to do so by a federal court—I conclude that the policy
arguments in favor of recognizing same-sex common law marriage are even more
compelling than they are in jurisdictions that currently recognize same-sex
common law marriage.
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Common Law Same-Sex Marriage
PETER NICOLAS*
I. INTRODUCTION
When courts and legislators in Iowa,1 the District of Columbia,2 and
New Hampshire3 extended the right to marry to same-sex couples, they did
more than just join the small but growing list of jurisdictions in the United
States to do so.4 In addition, they introduced the possibility that—for the
first time in the United States—a same-sex couple might be able to enter
into a legally recognized common law marriage.
Historically in the United States, there have existed two major types of
marriage: ceremonial marriage and common law marriage.5 A ceremonial
marriage is a marriage that comes into being through a formal process that
involves compliance with statutory formalities, such as applying for a
license, followed by formal solemnization by a religious or civil official.6
In contrast, a common law marriage is a marriage that comes into being
informally through the statements and conduct of the two individuals,
* Jeffrey & Susan Brotman Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. I wish
to thank Professors Helen Anderson and Mary Fan and Dean Kellye Testy for their valuable feedback.
1
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009) (“[T]he language in [the] Iowa Code . . .
limiting civil marriage to a man and a woman must be stricken from the statute, and the remaining
statutory language must be interpreted and applied in a manner allowing gay and lesbian people full
access to the institution of civil marriage.”).
2
D.C. CODE § 46-401(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
3
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (Supp. 2009).
4
Other states that extend the right to marry to same-sex couples include Connecticut, Vermont,
and Massachusetts. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-20(4) (West Supp. 2010); 2009 Conn. Acts 78−79
(Reg. Session); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (“We declare that barring an individual from the
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a person
of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”). For a period of just under five months,
same-sex couples were lawfully permitted to marry in California. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein,
Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A1 (“On Wednesday [after
Proposition 8 passed], five months of same-sex marriages in California—declared legal by the State
Supreme Court in May—appeared to have come to a halt.”); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d
384, 453 (Cal. 2008) (holding that statutes limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman
was unconstitutional, and must be understood as making marriage available to opposite-sex and samesex couples). The right for same-sex couples to marry was rescinded by Proposition 8, a voter initiative
that amended California’s constitution, to provide, “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is
valid or recognized in California.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59, 64
(Cal. 2009) (holding that Proposition 8 lawfully amended the constitution of California).
5
52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 1 (2000); see also In re Marriage of Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612,
616−17 (Iowa 2004) (explaining that Iowa recognizes two types of marriage: ceremonial marriage,
which is governed by statute, and common law marriage, which is informal).
6
52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 13 (2000).
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without formal solemnization or compliance with statutory formalities.7
When entered into, a common law marriage provides the same rights,
privileges, and responsibilities as a ceremonial marriage,8 and is as durable
as a ceremonial marriage, requiring divorce proceedings to terminate the
relationship.9 Thus, while common law marriage allows for a less formal
method of entry into marriage, there is no equally informal exit option,
such as “common-law divorce.”10
Once available in a majority of U.S. states, common law marriages fell
out of favor during the twentieth century,11 and today only eleven states
and the District of Columbia recognize common law marriages newly
entered into within their borders,12 although other states will typically
recognize common law marriages lawfully entered into in sister states.13
Given the small number of states that recognize same-sex marriages
and the small number of states that still recognize common law marriages,
it is perhaps no surprise that, until recently, there was no overlap between
those two groups and thus, no possibility that a same-sex couple could
legally enter into a common law marriage,14 making the concept of
7

52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 36 (2000); 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 10 (2009).
See, e.g., Robinson v. Evans, 554 A.2d 332, 337 (D.C. 1989) (“[A] common-law marriage is as
valid as any performed by a magistrate or a member of the clergy.”); Martin, 681 N.W.2d at 617 (“[A]
common law marriage is as valid as a ceremonial marriage.”); 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 41 (2000)
(“[A] common-law marriage is as valid as a ceremonial marriage. It is treated with the same dignity as
a ceremonial marriage and given the same legal significance.” (footnotes omitted)); 55 C.J.S. Marriage
§ 10 (2009) (“[C]ommon-law marriages are as fully valid as ceremonial marriages . . . .”); PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.01 cmt. a (Am. Law
Inst. 2000) (“Where recognized, common-law marriage is fully equivalent to duly licensed ceremonial
marriage.”).
9
Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L.
REV. 709, 737 (1996); see also 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 41 (2000) (“The mere passage of time and
ceasing of cohabitation will not serve to terminate a common-law marriage once it is in existence.”).
10
Lisa Milot, Restitching the American Marital Quilt: Untangling Marriage from the Nuclear
Family, 87 VA. L. REV. 701, 708 (2001).
11
Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights
and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2037–38
(2000).
12
See Jennifer Thomas, Comment, Common Law Marriage, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 151,
151 (2009) (listing fifteen states that recognize common law marriages, but noting that four of them
only recognize common law marriages created before dates specified by law). Of those eleven states,
one state—New Hampshire—recognizes common law marriages entered into within its borders only
for limited purposes. Id.
13
See, e.g., People v. Badgett, 895 P.2d 877, 897 (Cal. 1995) (noting that California recognizes
common law marriages “contracted in another state that would be valid by the laws of that state”);
Smith v. Smith, 111 A.2d 531, 533 (N.H. 1955) (“When a common-law marriage has been validly
contracted, it will be recognized as valid in another state in which the parties later become
domiciled . . . .”); Mott v. Duncan Petroleum Trans., 414 N.E.2d 657, 658–59 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that
New York will recognize a common law marriage as valid “if it is valid where contracted”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) & cmt. g. (1971); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 123 (1934).
14
The four states—California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont—in which same-sex
marriage was lawful prior to legal recognition of same-sex marriages in Iowa, the District of Columbia,
and New Hampshire have not ever recognized common law marriage or have not done so for some
time. See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 587 (Cal. 1988) (noting that common law marriages
8
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common law same-sex marriage an interesting concept in the abstract but
little more. In only a handful of cases have litigants even suggested the
possibility that a court recognize a same-sex common law marriage, and in
those cases, courts held that common law marriage is an alternative to, and
not a competing substitute for, ceremonial marriage, and thus that a type of
ceremonial marriage that is prohibited by law cannot be entered into by
means of a common law marriage.15
Yet, with the introduction of legalized same-sex marriage in Iowa,
New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia, there now exists the very
real possibility that a same-sex couple could be deemed legally married,
and have that marriage recognized in other states, without filling out a
marriage application or going through any sort of formal ceremonial
process. In other words, common law gay marriage—a true fusion of
something old and something new—has arrived in the United States.
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE LAW IN IOWA, NEW HAMPSHIRE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Although entering into a common law marriage does not require a
formal process, there are certain elements that must exist in order for a
common law marriage to come into being. While these elements vary
across jurisdictions, they are typically said to include the following: (1) a
present intent and mutual agreement to be married; and (2) cohabitation as
a couple.16 In addition, many jurisdictions require that the couple hold
themselves out to others as a married couple, and/or that they are so
reputed to be within their community.17 The three jurisdictions in which
same-sex common law marriage is theoretically possible differ somewhat
significantly from one another on the elements required to establish a
common law marriage.
have been illegal in the state since 1895); Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143, 146 (Cal. 1898) (holding that
marriage requires solemnization by a judge, justice of the peace, or priest); Loughlin v. Loughlin, 910
A.2d 963, 972 (Conn. 2006) (stating that common law marriages are not recognized); State ex. rel.
Felson v. Allen, 29 A.2d 306, 307–08 (Conn. 1942) (stating that all marriages not conforming to
statutory requirements are void); Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998) (“We have never
recognized common law marriage in this Commonwealth . . . .”); Collins v. Guggenheim, 631 N.E.2d
1016, 1017 (Mass. 1994) (noting that common law marriages are invalid); Stahl v. Stahl, 385 A.2d
1091, 1092 (Vt. 1978) (stating that the state does not accept common law marriages); Morrill v.
Palmer, 33 A. 829, 830–31 (Vt. 1895) (holding that common law marriage has never been valid in the
state).
15
See De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 953–55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (stating that “the limits
of common law marriage must be defined in light of the limits of statutory marriage”); accord Kulstad
v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 599, 610 (Mont. 2009) (affirming the lower court’s determination that a
same-sex common law marriage is not recognized and therefore cannot be dissolved).
16
52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage §§ 37–39 (2000); 55 C.J.S. Marriage §§ 10, 13, 23, 24, 26 (2009).
Capacity to make such an agreement is sometimes also listed as an element, 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 13,
but because capacity is required for both ceremonial and common law marriages, courts do not always
mention it as an element of common law marriage.
17
52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 40 (2000).
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Under Iowa law, three elements must exist to create a common law
marriage: (1) a present intent and agreement to be married by both parties;
(2) continuous cohabitation; and (3) a public declaration that the parties are
husband and wife.18 Iowa precedent considers the public declaration to be
the “acid test” of whether a common law marriage exists;19 there is thus no
such thing in Iowa as a “secret common law marriage,” although precedent
allows for some declarations that are inconsistent with marriage—indeed,
even some in which the person indicates being single—requiring only a
“substantial holding out to the public in general . . . .”20
In contrast, there are only two elements needed to establish a common
law marriage in the District of Columbia: (1) “an express mutual
agreement to be husband and wife,” in words of the present tense; (2)
followed by cohabitation as husband and wife.21 Thus, under District of
Columbia law, there is no requirement that the couple hold itself out or be
reputed to be a couple, allowing for the possibility—at least as a theoretical
matter—of a so-called “secret common law marriage.”22
New Hampshire is the most unusual of the three states, so unusual that
it is sometimes difficult to decide whether to classify it as a state that
recognizes common law marriage, although at the very least it can be said
to recognize a limited form of common law marriage.23 In New
Hampshire, the general rule is that it will not recognize a common law
marriage entered into within its borders except to the “limited extent”
provided by statute, under which there is an exception to this general rule
after the death of one of the two persons, for probate and inheritance
purposes.24 If both of the partners to the marriage are alive, a court in New
Hampshire will not consider them “married” for purposes of divorce,
alimony, or any other right, privilege, or responsibility of marriage.25
Pursuant to the terms of the New Hampshire statute, a couple will be
deemed to have been legally married upon or after the death of one partner
if they (1) cohabited and acknowledged each other as husband and wife
and were “generally reputed to be such”; (2) for a period of three years and
until the death of one partner.26 The requirement that there be an
18

In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Marriage of
Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612, 617–18 (Iowa 2004).
19
Martin, 681 N.W.2d at 618.
20
Id.; accord In re Estate of Dallman, 228 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Iowa 1975).
21
East v. East, 536 A.2d 1103, 1105 (D.C. 1988).
22
Martin, 681 N.W.2d at 618.
23
Bowman, supra note 9, at 770–71.
24
In re Estate of Bourassa, 949 A.2d 704, 706 (N.H. 2008).
25
See Joan S. v. John S., 427 A.2d 498, 499–500 (N.H. 1981) (“The plaintiff asks us . . . to apply
a divorce-like property settlement to this case. This we decline to do. The right to a divorce is
predicated upon the existence of a valid marriage between the parties.”); Fowler v. Fowler, 79 A.2d 24,
27 (N.H. 1951) (stating that New Hampshire does not recognize common law marriages).
26
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (Supp. 2009).
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acknowledgement refers to a public acknowledgement to third persons,27
which, when coupled with the requirement that they be reputed as such,
makes it akin to Iowa’s test barring secret common law marriages. In
addition, it is the only one of the tests that has a minimum period of
cohabitation and public acknowledgement as a couple.
Although the various tests for common law marriage use the gendered
phrase “husband and wife,” it seems likely that courts in states recognizing
ceremonial same-sex marriage would adapt their common law to include
those who cohabit as, and hold themselves out as, “husband and husband”
or “wife and wife.” Indeed, when the District of Columbia extended
marriage rights to same-sex couples, it enacted a statute making it clear
that gender-specific terms relating to the marital relationship, whether they
appear in statutes or in the common law, shall be construed to be gender
neutral.28
Thus, while each of the three jurisdictions has a slightly different test,
it appears that—at least as a doctrinal matter—common law same-sex
marriage is a possibility in all three states.
III. DOES COMMON LAW SAME-SEX MARRIAGE MAKE SENSE?
Despite the mechanically neat doctrinal arguments in favor of
recognizing common law same-sex marriage in jurisdictions in which
common law marriage exists, it is fair to ask whether it makes sense from a
public policy standpoint to expand the scope of a waning doctrine such as
common law marriage to encompass the relatively novel concept of
granting legal recognition to same-sex relationships.29
To answer this question, it helps to ask why common law marriage
came into being in the first place, and what has motivated some states to
eliminate it. According to many courts and commentators, judicial
recognition of common law marriages occurred as a matter of historical
necessity since the social conditions of America’s frontier society made
access to clergy or public officials difficult, due to the difficulties of
traveling and the lack of nearby officials.30 As society evolved and travel
became more fluid, the rationale for recognizing common law marriages
27
See Bourassa, 949 A.2d at 707 (affirming the trial court’s finding that the parities did not
acknowledge their marriage when they told third parties they were not married).
28
D.C. CODE § 46-401(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
29
See De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 955 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (noting that, over time, the
common law has moved toward reluctant toleration of common law marriage, and that “[t]o expand
common law marriage to include a contract between two persons of the same sex would be, not simply
inconsistent with such reluctant toleration, but an about-face”).
30
E.g., id.; John B. Crowley, Is the Honeymoon over for Common-Law Marriage: A
Consideration of the Continued Viability of the Common-Law Marriage Doctrine, 29 CUMB. L. REV.
399, 402–03 (1999); Perry Dane, A Holy Secular Institution, 58 EMORY L.J. 1123, 1147 (2009); Ashley
Hedgecock, Untying the Knot: The Propriety of South Carolina’s Recognition of Common Law
Marriage, 58 S.C. L. REV. 555, 560 (2007); Thomas, supra note 12, at 155.
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31

dissipated.
To be sure, in the modern era, problems of travel have largely been
eliminated, and public and religious officials are prevalent throughout the
country. Yet in another sense, America—or at least certain parts of it—
remains a frontier society of sorts for gays and lesbians, who perceive,
often with good reason, that their relationships are not valued by public
and religious officials charged with solemnizing marriages. Indeed, in
states in which same-sex marriage has been legalized, some officials have
refused to solemnize marriages between persons of the same sex, and some
local governments have even gone so far as to stop issuing licenses to
opposite-sex couples as a means of avoiding having to marry same-sex
couples.32 Moreover, many of the statutes extending the right to marry to
same-sex couples include specific provisions stating that religious officials
are free to refuse to solemnize a marriage that is inconsistent with their
religious beliefs.33 Thus, because gays and lesbians may lack full access to
those charged with solemnizing marriages, the spirit behind the “frontier
society” rationale for recognizing common law marriage makes some
sense as far as same-sex marriages are concerned.
Moreover, not all courts and commentators accept the “frontier
society” rationale for recognizing common law marriages, or they describe
it as, at best, the stated rationale but not the true reason for recognition.34
As an initial matter, the courts and commentators who invoke the “frontier
society” rationale do not support their contention with actual data from
historical records showing the absence of available clergy and public
officials,35 and indeed, critics of that rationale contend that religious and
civil officials empowered to perform marriages were regularly present
throughout America’s frontier society.36 In addition, critics of the “frontier
society” rationale point out that recognition or non-recognition of common
31
E.g., De Santo, 476 A.2d at 955; Dane, supra note 30, at 1147–48; Hedgecock, supra note 30,
at 564; Thomas, supra note 12, at 160.
32
See, e.g., Marisa Lagos, 2 Counties Won’t Do Weddings, Gay or Not, S.F. CHRON., June 11,
2008, at A1 (reporting that some clerks and activists claim that the decisions of two California counties
to stop performing all wedding ceremonies due to a lack of resources may be veiled discrimination
against gay and lesbian couples).
33
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-22b (Supp. 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(I), (II)
(Supp. 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(l) (Supp. 2009); id. tit. 18, § 5144(b).
34
See, e.g., In re Estate of Hall, 588 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (Grey, J., concurring)
(stating that the frontier society rationale “may have been a good rationale, it is hardly in accord with
the real circumstances of frontier life”); Sonya C. Garza, Common Law Marriage: A Proposal for the
Revival of a Dying Doctrine, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 541, 542–43 (2006) (noting that most scholars rely
on the frontier conditions argument, but that it is not all true and that there was a singular rationale for
the adoption of common law marriage).
35
See John L. McCormack, Title to Property, Title to Marriage: The Social Foundation of
Adverse Possession and Common Law Marriage, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 461, 473–74 (2008) (noting that
“proponents of the ‘frontier conditions’ argument base their contention on assumptions about what
frontier conditions actually were instead of historical records”).
36
Hall, 588 N.E.2d at 208 (Grey, J., concurring).
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law marriage across the United States was often not correlated with the
“frontier conditions” extant in a given jurisdiction; for example, common
law marriage was recognized in New York City but not in Wyoming.37
If not frontier conditions, what other rationales existed for recognizing
common law marriages? One oft-cited rationale is a libertarian concept of
autonomy and independence, the idea that marriage is a natural right and
that individuals should be free to enter into marriages without the need to
invoke the power of the state.38 That rationale would appear to have
particular force so far as same-sex couples are concerned: having
experienced for so long the denial of the right to marry at the hands of
public officials,39 the idea of being able to enter into marriage without
invoking the assistance of a state-sanctioned official would likely have a
certain amount of appeal for same-sex couples. Indeed, the quest to
expand marriage to include same-sex couples is arguably a libertarian
one—although the pure libertarian position would probably be to eliminate
state involvement in the business of marriage altogether.
Other historical rationales for recognizing common law marriage apply
with equal force to same-sex couples. Among those were legitimizing the
children of those who did not enter into ceremonial marriages and
preventing women—historically, the dependent partner in an opposite-sex
couple—from becoming economically dependent on the state should their
partners die or decide to leave them.40 Broadly construed, these two
rationales apply with equal force today to many same-sex couples, for
despite the offensiveness of the concept of “legitimacy” in the former and
the gendered nature of the latter, both rationales are designed to assure the
same thing: that economically dependent members of a family unit are
financially supported.41
Nor is the “meretricious relationship” doctrine that has developed in
states that have abolished common law marriage—such as in California42
37

Bowman, supra note 9, at 724; McCormack, supra note 35, at 474.
See Hall, 588 N.E.2d at 208 (Grey, J., concurring) (noting that common law marriage was
adopted in recognition of the importance of personal independence and to avoid the injustice of not
recognizing an otherwise valid marriage); Bowman, supra note 9, at 723 (“[U]pholding the ability to
marry without invoking the civil authority may have been seen as a mark of freedom and autonomy
from control of the state.”); Thomas, supra note 12, at 156 (“The first and probably most important
rationale for the adoption of common law marriage was the belief that marriage derived from a natural
right that every human possessed.”).
39
E.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949–50 (Mass. 2003) (noting that
same-sex couples were denied marriage licenses by city and town clerks); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971) (noting that a same-sex couple was denied a marriage license by the
county clerk).
40
Thomas, supra note 12, at 156–57, 162.
41
See id. at 157 (noting that couples were responsible for the support of their offspring and that
courts encouraged families to take care of each other).
42
See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976) (“[A]dults who voluntarily live together
and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respecting
38
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43

or Washington —an adequate substitute for common law marriage for
same-sex couples, notwithstanding the fact that the doctrine has been
extended to them.44 The scope of the meretricious relationship doctrine is
extremely narrow and is limited to a small set of property rights and, thus,
is in no way analogous to common law marriage.45 As a result, couples
covered by the doctrine cannot invoke other rights and responsibilities
associated with marriage, such as the privilege not to testify against one
another46 or to sue for the wrongful death of the other.47
In sum, while there may be good reasons for a state to opt to eliminate
common law marriage for all couples, such as the evidentiary problems
associated with proving that the marriage was entered into and the
attendant risk of fraudulent claims,48 the arguments in favor of common
law marriage generally apply with equal force to same-sex couples. So
long as a state concludes that common law marriage makes sense for
opposite-sex couples, it should extend that right to same-sex couples as
well.
IV. COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND THE CAVEAT OF THE CLOSET
Same-sex couples differ in one important way from their heterosexual
counterparts that may be significant in considering the expansion of
common law marriage to include them. While heterosexuals do not, as a
general rule, mask their sexual orientation (and by extension, do not mask
their earnings and property rights. . . . [T]hey may agree to pool their earnings and to hold all property
acquired during the relationship in accord with the law governing community property . . . .”).
43
See Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 350 (Wash. 2007) (applying Washington’s law of
meretricious or committed intimate relationships to divide assets between committed partners’ estates
where both partners are deceased); In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984)
(“[C]ourts must ‘examine the [meretricious] relationship and the property accumulations and make a
just and equitable disposition of the property.’”).
44
See Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 408 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that the
court saw no legal basis to make a distinction for same-sex partners when applying the theory of
Marvin); Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 737 (Wash. 2001) (noting that equitable claims under
theories such as the meretricious relationship doctrine are not “limited by the gender or sexual
orientation of the parties”).
45
See John E. Wallace, Comment, The Afterlife of the Meretricious Relationship Doctrine:
Applying the Doctrine Post-Mortem, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 243, 272 (2005) (noting that “[a]pplying
the meretricious relationship doctrine post mortem will not re-create common law marriage” and
acknowledging that meretricious partners have more limited property rights than married persons).
46
See, e.g., People v. Delph, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the
testimony of a woman who was cohabiting with the defendant and acting as the defendant’s wife was
not privileged).
47
See Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 582 (Cal. 1988) (stating that a plaintiff who “witnessed the
tortious injury and death of the person with whom he shared a cohabitant relationship” could not
recover for loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress).
48
See Bowman, supra note 9, at 735 (discussing courts’ concerns about fraudulent claims under
the common law marriage doctrine); Marsha Garrison, The Decline of Formal Marriage: Inevitable or
Reversible?, 41 FAM. L.Q. 491, 494–95 (2007) (discussing the decline in the number of states that
recognize common law marriage and increase in the number of evidentiary problems posed by common
law marriage doctrine).
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the nature of their relationship with their intimate partner), it is not at all
unusual for gay individuals to selectively or completely mask their sexual
orientation from friends, family, co-workers, and others due to fears of
discrimination, rejection, and violence.49 Is being closeted about one’s
sexual orientation—and the identity of one’s life partner—compatible with
the concept of common law marriage? On the flip side, does common law
marriage provide a method of entry into marriage for those same-sex
couples who want or need to closet their sexual orientation or their
relationships?
As discussed above, some states—including Iowa and New
Hampshire—require as an element of common law marriage that the
couple publicly hold themselves out as a married couple and be reputed as
such. In the words of the Iowa Supreme Court, there is no such thing as a
“secret common law marriage,”50 a requirement that would seem to make
common law marriage incompatible with the closet. Even Iowa’s test,
however, appears to allow a person to be partially closeted, for the court
has said that it requires only a “substantial” holding out to the public in
general, and has held common law marriages to be valid despite the fact
that the partners sometimes represented themselves as single.51 Thus, such
a test should be compatible with a couple who is to some extent out, but
who is selectively closeted, such as in situations in which they might fear a
particular instance of discrimination, rejection, or violence. In contrast, the
District of Columbia’s test for common law marriage appears to be
compatible with a deeper form of being closeted, as it neither requires that
the couple hold themselves out as a married couple nor that they be reputed
to be one.
Moreover, common law marriage allows a form of closeting one’s self
that may be of particular benefit to selected classes of gay and lesbian
couples. Specifically, those couples in which one partner is serving in the
military, or in which one is a foreign national present in the United States
on a temporary visa, might benefit from a legal regime in which their
relationship is “closeted” in the sense that it is not easily discoverable by
those conducting public record searches.
Under the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, service members
have historically been (and, in the short-term, continue to be) subject to
discharge if they marry or attempt to marry a person of the same-sex or

49
See Kristine Shaw, Local Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Laws: A Means of
Community Empowerment, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 385, 387 (2001) (“Fearing such
discrimination, many gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people do not ‘come out’ to their
employers, their co-workers, and even their friends and family.”).
50
In re Marriage of Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Iowa 2004).
51
See id. (“[I]t does not mean that all public declarations must be entirely consistent with
marriage.”).
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52

state that they are homosexual. Entering into a ceremonial marriage or,
for that matter, a domestic partnership or civil union, creates a public
record that could serve as evidence used to discharge a service member
under the military’s policy, either under the provision addressing marriage
and attempted marriage or that addressing statements regarding one’s
sexual orientation.53 Indeed, for this reason, advocates for the rights of
gays serving in the military counsel against entering into such
relationships.54 Although a common law same-sex marriage would still be
a “marriage” potentially subjecting a service member to discharge, and
while the act of holding one’s self out as a couple would likewise subject
one to discharge for making statements regarding one’s sexual orientation,
the lack of a paper trail in common law marriage reduces the risk of being
discovered, at least in a public records search. Accordingly, while by no
means foolproof, common law marriage could allow those serving in the
military the opportunity to continue to serve while at the same time
allowing them to marry.
Common law marriage might also be beneficial to same-sex couples
where one partner is a foreign national present in the United States on a
temporary visa. Because applicants for such visas are required to state in
their applications an intent to return to their home countries, evidence
contained in public records indicating that they have entered into a
marriage—or a domestic partnership or civil union—with a U.S. citizen or
permanent resident can result in either their deportation or their being
denied future temporary visas to enter the United States.55 As with those
subject to the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, entering into a
common law marriage could, in theory, subject a foreign national admitted
on a temporary visa to be deported or denied future temporary visas, but
52

10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2)–(3) (2006). Although Congress recently voted to repeal “don’t ask,
don’t tell,” the current policy remains in full force until sixty days after a variety of different policies
and regulations are put into place and a certification is made by the President, the Secretary of Defense,
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub.
Law No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (Dec. 22, 2010). For this reason, the Servicemembers Legal Defense
Network continues to advise members of the military not to disclose their sexual orientation in any
way. See SLDN Warning to Service Members—DADT Is Still in Effect, SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL
DEFENSE NETWORK, www.sldn.org/stillatrisk (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
53
SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE NETWORK, THE SURVIVAL GUIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” AND RELATED MILITARY POLICIES 11, 33 (5th ed. 2007).
54
See id. at 9–11 (counseling against same-sex marriage, or even attempted same-sex marriage, as
one of the three things that will lead to discharge).
55
See Adam Francoeur, The Enemy Within: Constructions of U.S. Immigration Law and Policy
and the Homoterrorist Threat, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 345, 360 (2007) (noting that evidence of a samesex marriage entered into in the United States may be construed by the government as intent to remain
past the terms of the visa, resulting in deportation or the denial of a visa petition); Amy K.R. Zaske,
Note, Love Knows No Borders—The Same-Sex Marriage Debate and Immigration Laws, 32 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 625, 651 (2006) (explaining that foreign nationals in the United States on a nonimmigrant visa are advised not to seek recognition of the relationship as it could be grounds for denial
of the visa).
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the lack of a paper trail reduces the likelihood of discovery, giving the
couple time to sort out their immigration issues while still establishing
their legal relationship as a couple.
V. THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON LAW SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE IN OTHER STATES
How likely is it that other states will join Iowa, the District of
Columbia, and New Hampshire in embracing the concept of common law
same-sex marriage? For any expansion of the doctrine to occur, at least
one of three events must occur: (1) a state that currently recognizes samesex marriages entered into within its borders but not common law
marriages must begin recognizing the latter; (2) a state that currently
recognizes common law marriages entered into within its borders but not
same-sex marriages must begin recognizing the latter; or (3) a state that
currently recognizes neither same-sex nor common law marriages entered
into within its borders must begin recognizing both.
The likelihood that one of the three states that currently recognizes
same-sex marriage but not common law marriage—Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and Vermont—will suddenly begin recognizing the latter is
extremely low. Massachusetts and Vermont have never recognized
common law marriage,56 and Connecticut has not recognized it since
1820.57 Moreover, the historical trends are against any state newly
recognizing common law marriage. While the majority of states that had
previously recognized the doctrine abandoned it during the twentieth
century,58 only one state that previously had not recognized the doctrine—
Utah—began recognizing common law marriages in the twentieth
century.59
Similarly, the likelihood that one of the nine remaining states that
recognize common law marriages entered into within their borders—
Alabama, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas, and Utah60—will voluntarily begin to recognize same-sex
marriages is extremely low. Of those nine states, all but one—Rhode
Island—have recently amended their state constitutions to explicitly ban
56
See Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998) (“We have never recognized common
law marriage in this Commonwealth . . . . We do not do so now.”); Morrill v. Palmer, 33 A. 829, 831
(Vt. 1895) (“We hold, therefore, that . . . the ‘loose doctrine of the common law’ in relation to marriage
was never in force in this state.”).
57
See State ex. rel. Felson v. Allen, 29 A.2d 306, 307 (Conn. 1942) (discussing the enactment of
the 1820 statute which invalidates any marriage not performed by certain persons, such as ministers).
58
See Bowman, supra note 9, at 731–32, 740 (discussing the waves of reform that have led to the
abolition of common law marriage at various times during the twentieth century).
59
Id. at 749.
60
See Thomas, supra note 12, at 151 (listing these states and five others that recognize common
law marriages under more limited circumstances).
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61

recognition of same-sex marriages.
Only in Rhode Island is there an
open question whether the state’s constitution requires that the state permit
same-sex couples to marry,62 and only in Rhode Island could the
legislature voluntarily extend the right to marry to same-sex couples
without a constitutional amendment.63
The recent decision, however, by a federal district court in California
striking down that state’s constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex
marriages on federal equal protection and due process grounds64—if
affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit or, ultimately,
the U.S. Supreme Court—raises the prospect of setting a precedent that
would require some or all states, including those that currently recognize
common law marriage, to extend the right to marry to same-sex couples.65
Accordingly, it is worth considering how the doctrine of common law
marriage in those nine states compares with that of Iowa, the District of
Columbia, and New Hampshire, as well as to consider the policy
arguments in favor of recognizing same-sex common law marriage in those
states.
Most of those remaining nine states, like Iowa and New Hampshire,
require that the couple hold themselves out publicly to others as a married
couple and/or that they are reputed so to be.66 Courts in some of those
states, including Alabama,67 Montana,68 and Texas,69 have explicitly held
61
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16; MONT.
CONST. art. XIII, § 7; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32;
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29.
62
See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 967–68 (R.I. 2007) (Suttell, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that the case required the court to consider only whether family court may recognize a
same-sex marriage for the limited purpose of entertaining a divorce petition, and not whether a samesex marriage is entitled to recognition in Rhode Island for any other purpose); Letter from Rhode Island
Attorney General Patrick C. Lynch to Commissioner Jack R. Warner (Feb. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/ri-ag-statement.pdf (concluding that because Rhode Island
does not have a strong public policy against homosexuals or same-sex relationships, Rhode Island
should recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed in Massachusetts).
63
With the recent election of Lincoln Chafee as governor in Rhode Island, the likelihood that the
right to marry will be extended to same-sex couples appears to have increased significantly. See, e.g.,
Peter Cassels, Chafee: Let’s Get Marriage Equality Passed, EDGE (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.edge
boston.com/index.php?ch=news&sc=&sc2=news&sc3=&id=111689; Amy Rasmussen, Chafee’s
Election Renews Hope for R.I. Gay Marriage Movement, BROWN DAILY HERALD (Nov. 11, 2010),
available at http://www.browndailyherald.com/news/metro/chafee-s-election-renews-hope-for-r-i-gaymarriage-movement-1.2401687.
64
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d. 921, 995, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
65
If the decision were to be affirmed by the Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to
review the decision, it would be binding on federal courts in one of the common law marriage states,
Montana, which is located in the Ninth Circuit.
66
See, e.g., Creel v. Creel, 763 So. 2d 943, 946 (Ala. 2000) (holding that because the Creels held
themselves out as being married following their 1976 divorce, Joyce Creel was the common law wife
of Joseph Creel at the time of his death).
67
In full, Alabama law requires the following to establish a common law marriage: “(1) capacity;
(2) present agreement or mutual consent to enter into the marriage relationship, permanent and
exclusive of all others; (3) public recognition of the existence of the marriage; and (4) cohabitation or
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that keeping the relationship a secret is inconsistent with this requirement;
thus, like Iowa, they have declared that there is no such thing as a secret
common law marriage,70 creating challenges for those same-sex couples
who are fully closeted. Most of the others, including Colorado,71 Kansas,72
Oklahoma,73 Rhode Island,74 and Utah,75 have not explicitly held that there
is no such thing as a secret common law marriage; yet, like New
Hampshire, these states make either holding themselves out as a couple, a
reputation as such, or both, a critical element for establishing a common
law marriage, thus making same-sex common law marriage an
impossibility for a fully closeted couple in those states. Even in these eight
states, like Iowa, some degree of being in the closet may be consistent with
the establishment of a common law marriage; thus, for example, Texas
courts have held that “a marriage that is secret from some persons can still
be a common-law marriage.”76 On the other hand, some decisions appear
mutual assumption openly of marital duties and obligations.” Adams v. Boan, 559 So. 2d 1084, 1086
(Ala. 1990).
68
In full, Montana law requires the following to establish a common law marriage: (1) the
competency of both individuals to enter into marriage; (2) mutual consent and agreement to enter into
it; and (3) cohabitation and public repute. E.g., In re Estate of Ober, 62 P.3d 1114, 1115 (Mont. 2003);
Barnett v. Hunsaker, 968 P.2d 281, 286 (Mont. 1998).
69
In full, Texas law requires the following to establish a common law marriage: (1) agreement to
be married; (2) cohabitation thereafter as husband and wife; and (3) representation of marriage to
others. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(a)(2) (West 2006); Russell v. Russell, 865 S.W.2d 929, 932
(Tex. 1993).
70
Golden v. Golden, 360 So. 2d 994, 996 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (holding that keeping the
relationship “clandestine, secret” is contrary to the public recognition requirement); Ober, 62 P.3d at
1117; Barnett, 968 P.2d at 286; Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Ex
Parte Threet, 333 S.W.2d 361, 364–65 (Tex. 1960) (“[T]here can be no secret common law
marriage . . . . The secrecy is inconsistent and irreconcilable with the requirement of a public holding
out that the couple are living together as husband and wife.”).
71
In full, Colorado law requires the following to establish a common law marriage: (1) mutual
consent or agreement of the parties to be husband and wife; (2) followed by a mutual and open
assumption of a marital relationship. People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660, 663–64 (Colo. 1987). A “mutual
public acknowledgement of the marital relationship” is considered “essential to the establishment of a
common law marriage.” Id. at 663–64.
72
In full, Kansas law requires the following to establish a common law marriage: “(1) capacity of
the parties to marry; (2) a present marriage agreement between the parties; and (3) a holding out of
each other as husband and wife to the public.” In re Adoption of X.J.A., 166 P.3d 396, 410 (Kan.
2007); In re Estate of Antonopoulos, 993 P.2d 637, 647 (Kan. 1999).
73
In full, Oklahoma law requires the following to establish a common law marriage: (1) actual,
mutual agreement to be husband and wife; (2) permanent relationship; (3) exclusive relationship, as
proved by cohabitation; and (4) holding out to the public as husband and wife. Blake v. State, 765 P.2d
1224, 1225 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
74
In full, Rhode Island law requires the following to establish a common law marriage: (1)
serious intention to enter into a husband-wife relationship; and (2) conduct of such character as to lead
to a belief in the community that they were married. Fravala v. City of Cranston ex. rel. Baron, 996
A.2d 696, 703 (R.I. 2010); Sardonis v. Sardonis, 261 A.2d 22, 24 (R.I. 1970).
75
In full, Utah law requires the following to establish a common law marriage: (1) cohabitation;
(2) assumption of marital rights and duties; (3) a holding out as and general reputation as husband and
wife; (4) capacity to marry; (5) capacity to give consent; (6) consent. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5
(LexisNexis 2007); Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 793–94 (Utah 1994).
76
Winfield v. Renfro, 821 S.W.2d 640, 651 (Tex. App. 1991); see also Vinson v. Vinson,
69 So. 2d 431, 433 (Ala. 1954) (requiring only that there be “some” public recognition); Petrarca v.
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to require that the couple be public about their relationship in at least some
situations in which they have nothing to gain financially or otherwise from
doing so; in Kansas, for example, a court found no common law marriage
for a couple that held themselves out as such only to their employer and
landlady, concluding that they held themselves out as married “only when
it was advantageous to assume a marriage posture.”77
The final state, South Carolina, like the District of Columbia, appears
to be a state in which a fully closeted same-sex couple could establish a
common law marriage if that state were to begin recognizing same-sex
marriages within its borders. Under South Carolina law, all that is required
to establish a common law marriage is mutual assent to marry. Although
cohabitation and reputation as a couple are a way of proving the mutual
assent to marry—and indeed, create a rebuttable presumption that such
mutual assent existed—cohabitation and reputation as a couple are not
separate elements necessary for establishing a common law marriage.78 In
the words of the South Carolina Supreme Court, “[t]he intent in marriage is
usually evidenced by a public and unequivocal declaration of the parties,
but that is not necessary; the intent may exist though never public and
formally declared . . . .”79
If same-sex marriage were to be legalized in these states by means of a
federal court decision, the policy arguments in favor of recognizing samesex common law marriage in most of these states would be even stronger
than they are in states such as Iowa, the District of Columbia, and New
Hampshire. The fact that eight of these nine states have amended their
constitutions to ban recognition of same-sex marriage suggests an even
more frontier-like environment for gay and lesbian couples in which actual
or perceived access to public and religious officials to solemnize their
marriages is likely to serve as a serious barrier to obtaining formal, legal
recognition of their relationships for some time to come.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is not at all unusual for gays and lesbians to refer publicly to their
partners as their “husband” or “wife” despite the fact that they are not
legally married to one another. With the expansion of legalized same-sex
marriage into states recognizing common law marriage, such statements—
previously largely symbolic in nature—take on legal significance in that
Castrovillari, 448 A.2d 1286, 1290 (R.I. 1982) (requiring only that the reputation for being married be
among those with whom the couple is acquainted).
77
State v. Johnson, 532 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Kan. 1975).
78
See Callen v. Callen, 620 S.E.2d 59, 62 (S.C. 2005) (“[W]hen the proponent proves that the
parties participated in ‘apparently matrimonial’ cohabitation, and that while cohabiting the parties had a
reputation in the community as being married, a rebuttable presumption arises that a common-law
marriage was created.”).
79
Kirby v. Kirby, 241 S.E.2d 415, 416 (S.C. 1978).
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they can, with the right intent and when other criteria are satisfied, serve as
the basis for forming a legally recognized common law marriage in certain
jurisdictions in the United States.
While common law marriage has its detractors, and there exist sound
policy arguments for its elimination, there is no basis in doctrine or policy
to permit its continued existence for opposite-sex couples while denying it
to same-sex couples. Indeed, there are sound reasons why in some cases it
makes even greater sense for common law marriage to be available to
same-sex couples.

